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In this essay, I will propose an alternative form of law school affirmative action that
does not rely on racial classifications, but nevertheless helps to remedy racial
discrimination, to diversify the educational environment and to provide resources for
underserved communities. In particular, I propose a "direct measures" program that
would grant admissions preferences on the basis of the following criteria: (1) whether
an applicant has suffered from the effects of racial discrimination; (2) whether, on
issues of racial and social justice, the applicant can contribute a perspective or
viewpoint not currently represented within the majority of the student population,
and (3) whether the applicant is likely to provide resources or services to underserved
communities. Because this form of affirmative action does not rely on racial
classifications, but instead directly measures an applicant's experiences, viewpoints
and commitments without regard to racial identity, it does not violate the equal
protection clause.
Nothing prevents Richmond from according a contracting
preference to identified victims of discrimination. While
most of the beneficiaries might be [B]lack, neither the
beneficiaries nor those disadvantaged by the preference
would be identified on the basis of their race.
-Justice Scalia in City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co.1
In recent years, race-conscious affirmative action programs have
come under increasingly hostile attack. In 1996, California voters enacted
Proposition 209, the "California Civil Rights Initiative" which prohibited
the use of race-conscious procedures in education, employment and gov-
ernment contracting.2 The referendum was part of a broader statewide
effort to eliminate race-conscious affirmative action at all levels of gov-
ernment. Only a few months before the proposition passed, the Regents
of the University of California system had adopted the "SP-1" admissions
program, which prohibited the use of race in admissions decisions?
Beyond California's borders, affirmative action opponents have also
scored other successes. In Washington, voters passed a referendum similar
to the one in California.4 In Florida, Governor Jeb Bush signed an execu-
tive order precluding educational institutions from considering race in
admissions.' In several court cases, challengers have also persuaded several
federal courts to strike down race-conscious affirmative action programs,
particularly those in graduate school admissions. Appellate courts in the
1. 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia,J., concurring).
2. See CAL. CONsT. art. I,§ 31.
3. See TiE REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF CAL., Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment: Admis-
sions (SP-1) (July 20,1995).
4. See WASH. REv CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West Supp. 2000).
5. Florida Governor's Exec. Order 99-281.
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Fifth and First Circuits have interpreted Title VI and the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit using race as a factor in educational admissions.6
Similarly, a federal court in Michigan recently has ruled that the Univer-
sity of Michigan's law school may not consider race as a factor in the
admissions process
Not surprisingly, minority enrollments have dropped dramatically in
those jurisdictions where race-conscious affirmative action is prohibited
Responding to the change in admissions standards, institutions of higher
learning are rapidly resegregating, particularly in the more prestigious
flagship schools and top-ranked schools in several state school systems.'
But affirmative action supporters recently have had cause for some
celebration. Unhappy with decreasing minority enrollments, several state
legislatures-including Texas, Florida and California-have attempted to
restore the benefits of diversity by automatically admitting a certain per-
centage of each high school's graduating class, regardless of the high
school's relative prestige or reputation.' Although commentators disagree
6. Of course, the most notable of these is Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir.
1996) (prohibiting use of race-based affirmative action in law school).The most recent deci-
sion to be issued was in Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F3d 1234 (11 th
Cir. 2001) (holding that even if diversity were a compelling government interest, program
awarding automatic point additions for racial identity was not narrowly tailored to achieve
diversity). See alsoWessmann v. Gittens, 160 E3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (prohibiting the use of
race in admissions for prestigious public high school in Boston).
7. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 E Supp 2d. 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).The trial court ruled
that diversity did not constitute a compelling interest, and that even if it did, the univer-
sity's program was too amorphous and arbitrary, and thus was not narrowly tailored to
achieve diversity. Id. at 848-49, 853.
8. See Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative in Action the 21st
Century, 33 ARoN L. Rxv. 209, 213 n.13 (2000) (documenting decreases in several profes-
sional schools and undergraduate institutions); Rachel F Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents:
The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. Ray. 2241,2246-48 (2000) (noting that
at Boalt Hall, enrollment for Black students dropped from 20 students in 1996, the last year
before SP-1 took effect, to 7 students in 1999).
9. See William Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments in Liti-
gation, Admissions and Diversity Research, 12 LA RAzA L.J. (forthcoming 2001) (describing
significant drops in minority enrollment in the University of California law schools and at
the University ofTexas law school). See also Adam Cohen, When the Field Is Level: In California,
Minority Students Are "Cascading" Out of Top Schools and Into the Second Tier. Is This Good for
Them?, TiMe, July 5, 1999, at 30 (documenting that post-Proposition 209 minority enroll-
ments decreased at more prestigious universities in U.C. System, including Berkeley and
UCLA, but increased at U.C. Irvine, Santa Cruz and Riverside); Kenneth Weiss, Fewer Blacks
and Latinos Enroll at UC, L.A.T Es, May 21,1998, at A3 (same).
10. According to 1997Texas General Laws 155,
[e]ach general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant for
admission to the institution as an undergraduate student if the applicant
graduated with a grade point average in the top 10 percent of the student's
high school graduating class in one of the two school years preceding the
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about whether these so-called "class-rank" programs ought to replace
race-conscious affirmative action, the programs have produced some small
gains in minority enrollments at some institutions.11 Other state institu-
tions have experimented with affirmative action based on class or
economic need, albeit with limited success. 2
More notably, federal appellate courts have begun to issue opinions
upholding the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action.
Finding that diversity constitutes a compelling government interest, a
separate federal trial court in Michigan 3 and the federal Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit14 both have upheld race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion as a constitutionally permissible means of diversifying the classroom.
Most remarkably, the political tide also appears to be shifting in favor
of race-conscious affirmative action. In the wake of significant turnover
on the University of California Board of Regents, a newly-constituted
board has voted to repeal the SP-1 affirmative action ban in admissions."
Moreover, an increasing number of schools are abandoning or modifying
the use of standardized tests, largely because such tests disproportionately
exclude applicants of color. In a move widely noted by the educational
community, the president of the University of California system recently
academic year for which the applicant is applying for admission and the
applicant graduated from a public or private high school in this state ....
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 5 51.803 (West 2001). California and Florida plans are quite simi-
lar: California admits the top 4 percent and Florida admits the top 20 percent of each
senior class. See Jeffrey Selingo, "hat States Aren't Saying About the "X-Percent Solution",
CHRON. HIGHER EDuC.,June 2, 2000, at A31, A32 (hereinafter Selingo, X-Percent Solution).
To the extent that these plans are at all successful in boosting minority numbers, their
success can be traced to the fact that the high schools are heavily segregated by race. Id.
(outlining debate about class-rank programs, and documenting increases in minority en-
rollments at the University ofTexas in undergraduate admissions).Thus, top achievers from
high schools in segregated neighborhoods will gain automatic admission as easily as stu-
dents from White high schools, even though the applicants of color might not have been
admitted otherwise under previous policies.
11. See Selingo, X-Percent Solution, supra note 10.
12. See infra notes 32-38, 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing class-based and dis-
advantaged-based affirmative action alternatives respectively).
13. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Unlike the district
court in Grutter, the court in Gratz held that educational diversity constitutes a governmental
interest sufficiently compelling to justify using race as part of the admissions process. Id. at
819-20.
14. See Smith v. Univ. ofWash. Law Sch., 233 F3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the
use of race in an affirmative action program did not violate Title VI or the equal protection
clause).
15. See Rebecca Trounson & Jill Leovy, UC Regents Vote to Rescind Ban on Affirmative
Action, L.A.Times, May 17,2001, at 1. But seeJeffiey Selingo, U. of California Board May Revisit
Ban on Affirmative Action in Admissions, CHRON. HIcER EDUC., Jan. 19, 2001, at A24 (noting
that such a move would only have symbolic value because Proposition 209 would remain in
place).
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called for the elimination of the Scholastic Aptitude Test in the admissions
process. 6 Likewise, the outgoing chancellor of the Florida university sys-
tem has urged schools to place less emphasis on standardized test scores.' 7
Indeed, several hundred colleges and universities already have abandoned
the standardized test score as part of their admissions criteria. 8
In the midst of such activity, it appears quite likely that at some
point in the near future, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether
race-conscious affirmative action violates federal or constitutional law.'9
Some court watchers predict that, given its current make-up, a closely
divided Court will strike down race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.2" At the very
least, a majority of the Court is likely to subject any race-conscious pro-
gram to strict scrutiny, even if that scrutiny is not necessarily "fatal in
fact."2'
Judging from the Court's recent decisions, there is good reason to
believe that the odds are against race-conscious affirmative action. In
various opinions on affirmative action in employment and voter redis-
tricting, the Court has looked with disfavor on the use of racial
classifications as a means of remedying discrimination, although the
Court has been closely divided along traditional political and ideological
lines.22
If the Court strikes down the use of race-conscious affirmative
action, law schools across the nation are likely to confront the same issue
currently facing law schools in Texas, California and Washington. Namely,
how can an institution pursue a commitment to remedying
16. The SAT Showdown, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5,2001, at 48.
17. Chancellor: Rely Less on SATTests, FLA. SuN-SENrIN , Feb. 28,2001, at lB.
18. Id. (noting that 300 colleges and universities do not rely on the SAT for admissions
decisions).
19. See, e.g., Jo Ann Zuniga, Focus: Equal Educational Opportunity for Hispanics, Hous.
CHRoN., Feb. 5, 2001, at 22 (Indiana University law professor Jorge Chapa predicts that the
Court will soon take up the issue because of the split between the Courts of Appeal); see also
Sara Hebel, Courting a Place in Legal History, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 24, 2000, at A23
(noting that Supreme Court decision on affirmative action is likely to come soon).
20. See, e.g., Zuniga, supra note 20, at 22 (reporting Chapa's prediction that the odds are
against the Court upholding affirmative action).
21. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995).Justice O'Connor's
original opinions in Adarand and Croson appear to express some sympathy to the idea of
remedial racial classifications. For O'Connor, such preferences are not per se unconstitutional
but might be upheld if they advance a compelling interest and were narrowly tailored. See
Justin Schwartz, A Not Quite Color-Blind Constitution: Racial Discrimination and Racial Preference
inJustice O'Connor's "Newest" Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1055, 1080-84
(1997). O'Connor's later opinions in the redistricting cases appear to come closer to a deci-
sion that racial classifications in any context, with the exception of remedying past
discrimination, are per se discrimination. See id. at 1093.
22. See infra notes 60-63,77-89 and accompanying text.
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discrimination, diversifying law school populations and providing
resources for underserved communities, all without violating the
Constitution? This essay proposes an alternative affirmative action
program that does not rely on racial classifications to achieve important
institutional goals. Rather, it proposes a program that directly measures an
applicant's ability to further these institutional goals.
Under a "direct measures" program, an applicant would be granted an
admissions preference if her application demonstrated that she met any of
three criteria: (1) that she had suffered from the effects of racial
discrimination; (2) that she likely would contribute an important and
under-represented viewpoint to the classroom on issues of social and racial
justice; and/or (3) that she likely would provide resources to underserved
communities.The direct measures program would bypass using the proxy of
racial identity for applicant experiences, viewpoints and commitments, to
directly measure those attributes without any reference to a particular racial
identity.
This program relies heavily on Justice Scalia's observation in the
opening quote that a preference for identified victims of discrimination
does not classify on the basis of race. Rather, the direct measures program
classifies applicants directly on the basis of their traits, qualities, interests,
viewpoints and commitments. Accordingly, I argue in this article that a
direct measures program should not be subject to strict scrutiny.
Similarly, I argue that a direct measures program is not a pretext for ra-
cial classification favoring members of particular racial groups. To the
contrary, I suggest that the direct measures program is consistent with the
intent to pursue the legitimate goals of remedying discrimination, diversify-
ing the classroom and providing services for the historically underserved.
Although racial identity may historically have served as a very useful proxy
for particular experiences, viewpoints and commitments, institutions
nevertheless can bypass the use of that proxy in favor of more direct
assessments of those qualifications.
Part I of this essay sets out in detail the direct measures affirmative
action program. This section also compares the program to other alterna-
tive affirmative action program experiments undertaken by various
educational institutions. In that regard, I argue that the direct measures
program brings together in one program the best aspects of these various
experiments.
Parts II and III discuss the constitutionality of a direct measures pro-
gram. First, in Part II, I argue that the direct measures program does not
constitute a racial classification, because the program operates without
relying on racial identity as an admissions factor. In making that argu-
ment, I draw from Justice Scalia's declaration in Croson that programs
targeting identified victims of racial discrimination do not constitute clas-
sifications based on race, so long as they do not rely on racial identity as a
proxy to identify victims of discrimination. I also point out that the
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Court has defined racial identity quite narrowly, to distinguish the social
experiences and history associated with race from the immutable charac-
teristics that constitute race per se. Accordingly, I argue that under the
Court's own definitions, the direct measures program does not create
classifications on the basis of this narrowly defined concept of racial iden-
tity.
In Part III, I anticipate and answer the argument that the direct
measures program is designed to achieve a discriminatory purpose,
namely, to implement a racial classification under the pretext of remedy-
ing discrimination. In response, I argue that the criteria used in the direct
measures program is more consistent with a law school's intent to directly
measure and assess applicants' experiences, viewpoints and commitments.
Certainly, the fact that the program will admit White students who qual-
ify under the requisite criteria demonstrates the intent to directly assess
applicant characteristics, rather than an intent to classify on the basis of
race for its own sake. Indeed, as this section points out, historical evidence
indicates that law schools originally used race as a proxy in affirmative
action programs for reasons of efficiency, in order to measure for certain
experiences, viewpoints and commitments in an administratively efficient
way. The direct measures program accomplishes the same goals without
the use of race as a proxy.
Part IV explores the broader theoretical appeal of a direct measures
program. This section notes that a direct measures program will encour-
age applicants and law school admissions committees to more fully
describe applicants' experiences and histories of discrimination. These
descriptions can contribute a great deal to the national conversation
about the parameters of racial discrimination. In addition, the program is
self-terminating, unlike conventional race-conscious affirmative action.
Finally, such a program works "within the system'" to create a set of pref-
erences that are based not on racial identity but on the very things that
the Court itself has said are not part of racial identity-historical experi-
ences, viewpoints and commitments.
L.A PROPOSAL:THE DIRECT MEASURES PROGRAM
A. Suggested Admissions Criteria
I propose an admissions program that seeks directly to measure the
qualities, characteristics, perspectives and commitments of an applicant
with regard to a number of areas. In particular, the program would grant
preferences based on those qualities, and not on the basis of racial identity.
The program asks the admissions committee, and the applicant herself, to
assess the candidate according to the following three categories of criteria
and suggested descriptive subquestions within each category:
FALL 2001]
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(1) Has the applicant or applicant's family been subject to the
effects of racial discrimination or race-related adversity,
past or present, including but not limited to direct, institu-
tional or societal discrimination on the basis of race?
Has the applicant been excluded from opportunities, re-
sources or benefits on the basis of her racial identity?
Discrimination can be direct and invidious, or more subtle
and institutional. With regard to the latter, for example, has
the applicant resided in neighborhoods that are segregated
by race?23 Has the applicant attended primary or secon-
dary educational institutions, or institutions of higher
learning, whose enrolled students are predominantly stu-
dents of one race, and whose funding levels, teacher
assignments, facilities, extracurricular activities and trans-
portation resources are consistently below the national or
regional average? 4
More generally, will providing this applicant access to a le-
gal education help to compensate for past and continuing
racial discrimination against the applicant?
(2) Will the applicant, based on her life experiences or her
own ideas and thinking, contribute a perspective or view-
point on issues of racial justice that is currently not well-
represented in the student population?
Does the applicant have a set of life experiences that differ
from those of the majority student population? Will the
applicant likely draw on that set of experiences to con-
tribute viewpoints on issues of racial or social justice that
are not currently represented among the majority of the
student population?
25
Has the applicant developed alternative perspectives, ideas,
viewpoints, interests, visions, and/or arguments about is-
sues of racial justice that are not currently represented by
the majority of the student population?
23. For the argument that institutional and individual racism produces segregated
neighborhoods, see generally Lawrence Bobo and Camille Zubrinsky, Attitudes on Residential
Integration: Perceived Status Differences, Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?, 74 Soc.
FORCEs 883 (1996); Ruth Hoogland DeHoog, Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban Ghettos:
Some Empirical Observations on Institutional Racism, 13J. URB.AFr. 479 (1991).
24. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (holding that a segregated school
includes racialized inequalities in the above-listed categories).
25. For the argument that backgrounds and life experiences can contribute to the de-
velopment of unique viewpoints, see Akhil Amar and Neal Katyal, Bakke' Fate, 43 UCLA L.
Ryv. 1745, 1746 (1996).
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(3) Is the applicant likely to provide services or resources to
communities that are legally underserved or dispropor-
tionately excluded by legal institutions?
Has the applicant developed a significant relationship with,
or commitment to, local or national communities that have
been underserved by legal institutions, or that have previ-
ously been underrepresented in political and legal
institutions? Is the applicant likely to further that commit-
ment or relationship in pursuing her educational activities,
including the production of scholarship, activities in the
classroom or institutional activities? Is the applicant likely to
provide resources or services to the communities with
which she has developed a relationship or commitment to
serve?26 Will a legal education help the applicant both to
further develop that commitment or relationship, and to
provide resources or services to those communities?
Administering a direct measures program undoubtedly will be both
expensive and time-consuming for admissions committees, which will
have to evaluate the entire applicant file including the personal statement.
To avoid constitutional difficulty however, applications should in no way
be pre-screened based on the racial identity of the applicants.
That is not to say that the admissions committee must hide from
view the applicant's racial identity. Admissions committees constitution-
ally can be aware of an applicant's racial identity without relying on racial
identity per se in evaluating whether to admit her under the direct meas-
ures program. The U.S. Supreme Court has found it wholly permissible
for state legislatures to be aware of race when they draw redistricting lines
so long as they do not intend to create a classification based on racial
identity.27 Likewise, admissions conunittees can be aware of an applicant's
race when evaluating applicants in a direct measures program without
relying on race to make a determination.
Finally, law schools' admissions committees may need to abandon the
use of the Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT") altogether. This essay
proposes, at the very least, law schools should rely on LSAT scores solely
to pre-screen an initial set of applicants, to exclude those whose scores
predict failure in the institution. The Law School Admissions Council
itself warns schools that test scores are not sufficiently predictive to
warrant drawing fine distinctions between applicants based on slightly
26. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, although there may be a correlation between
race and willingness to provide resources to underserved communities, a more reliable way to
select such applicants is to locate applicants, whatever their race, who have demonstrated a
commitment to serving such communities. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265,310 (1978).
27. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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differing test scores." Beyond a threshold screening function, schools
should make no further use of standardized test scores, and in no event
should they use test scores to draw distinctions between students for
purposes of final selection."
A full discussion of the LSAT suggestion would detract from the fo-
cus of this article. At the same time, it is important to understand the
relationship between the LSAT's disproportionate impact on applicants of
color, and the timing of the test's adoption at the turn of the century-
during a period when excluding people of color from law school admis-
sion was routine and uncontroversial.3" Given the test's disproportionate
impact, its limited predictive value and questionable history, law schools
should minimize, if not eliminate altogether, the LSAT's role in the ad-
missions process.
B. Experiments in Race-Neutral Affirmative Action
In many ways, the direct measures program draws on the most
promising aspects of other race-neutral alternatives. Responding to the
controversy over race-conscious affirmative action programs, various state
governments and educational institutions have explored several types of
alternatives to race-conscious preferences.3" First, some law schools have
28. Philip D. Shelton, Executive Directors Report-The LSAT Median: So What?, in LSAC,
LAW SERVICES REPORT 3 (Mar./Apr. 1995) ("Just as a single point or two should be irrelevant
when evaluating an individual applicant for admission, one or two point differentials in
schools' 'medians' should not carry the significance it [sic] appears to have today"); see also
William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender Bias in the LSAT and its Relationship to
Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J. L. & FEMINIsM 1, 21 n.92 (2000) (discussing
LSAC warnings and recommendations with regard to the use of test scores).
29. See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN (1997).
There is in fact evidence of a performance differential for those who are
admitted from the very, very bottom of the LSAT pool. For this reason,
using the LSAT as an entry level floor (basically a pass/fail bar) may make
sense. The problem is that the law school does not simply use the LSAT
as if it were a blunt instrument separating the wheat from the chaff. It
uses the LSAT as if incremental differences within a relatively wide band
above the floor are meaningful, despite the fact that those incremental
differences do not predict law school performance for most male or fe-
male Penn students.
Id. at 125 n.74. Cf Catherine Pieronek, Review of Lani Guinier's Becoming Gentlemen, 25 J.C. &
U.L. 627,632 (1999) (questioning these statistics).
30. Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. RV
1449, 1478-91 (documenting the evolutionary history of the LSAT), 1492 (noting the
LSAT's disproportionate impact on applicants of color) (1998).
31. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action,
88 GEO. LJ. 2331, 2332-33 (2000). For an extended discussion of class-based affirmative
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experimented with affirmative action based on economic need, and have
given preferences to those applicants who can demonstrate financial hard-
ship or economic disadvantage.32 For example, in 1997, in an attempt to
preserve diversity after the passage of Proposition 209, UCLA College of
Law adopted a program based on economic need, as measured by a num-
ber of admissions criteria.33 To date, the program has produced little in the
way of results. Even with the program in place, Black enrollment at
UCLA College of Law has dropped by 72%, and Latino/a enrollment by
26%."4 Indeed, in the fall of 1999, only two Black students enrolled in the
law school's entering class of 286 students.35 Judging from these results, it
would appear that class-based affirmative action has not fully captured the
scope of disadvantage faced by applicants of color who have been victims
of discrimination.
In fact, many scholars criticize class-based programs precisely be-
cause they do not address the unique socio-economic hardships suffered
by victims of discrimination. 6 Professor Deborah Malamud points out
that even when Black and White families enjoy the same middle-class
status, Black families suffer relative economic disadvantage in several
forms. For example, they are relatively subject to far more housing dis-
crimination, attend schools that are less well-funded and are attended by
more low-income students, and are more victimized by crime. They do
not have the same access to good jobs or get paid equally for the same
job. Likewise, they enjoy less income security, perform less well on stan-
dardized tests, and are less likely to transmit their middle-class status to
the next generation.37 Malamud argues that economic affirmative action
does not take into account these racialized economic differences, and has
action, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND AFFuMArivE ACTION
(1996).
32. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 31, at 2332,2389.
33. For a detailed empirical review of the UCLA School of Law's experiment with
class-based admissions preferences, see Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997).
34. See Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J. LEGAL EDUc. 504
(1997).
35. See Jerome Karabel, Affirmative Action Had Real Merit, L.A. TsEs, July 10, 2000, at B7.
36. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity and the Middle Class, 68 U.
CoLo. L. RE. 939, 967-87 (1997) (hereinafter Malamud, Middle Class); Linda FWightman,
The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education:An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences ofAbandoning
Race as a Factor in Law SchoolAdmission Decisions, 72 N.YU. L. R.v. 1 (1997) (reviewing appli-
cant data from law school admissions database, and concluding that affirmative action based
on economic need would not preserve diversity);TungYin, A Carbolic Smoke Ballfor the Nine-
ties: Class-BasedAffirmativeAction, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 213,235 (1997) (reviewing Kahlenberg,
supra note 31).
37. See Malamud, Middle Class, supra note 36, at 939, 967-87 (1997).
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failed to reflect the unique economic disadvantage produced by racial
discrimination."
Several institutions have also explored the use of programs based on
class-rank-the so-called "X percent" programs-which admit a certain
percentage of each high school's graduates to the state's university
system.39 Both the Texas and California legislatures have enacted
legislation that automatically admits a certain percentage of each high
school graduating class (Texas admits the top 10% and California the top
4%). Florida has enacted a similar plan to admit the top 20% of each
class.'
Preliminary results from class-rank plans appear quite mixed. In
combination with a dramatic outreach program targeting minority stu-
dents, the "X percent" plan appears to have restored undergraduate
minority enrollments at the University of Texas at Austin to pre-Hopwood
levels.41 California has not yet had the opportunity to assess the effect of
its percentage plan on minority enrollment. 42 Although Florida's percent-
age plan appears to have boosted minority enrollment somewhat,
detractors point out both that overall enrollment has increased signifi-
cantly, and that the plan did not take effect until July of 2000, well after
the period during which most university freshmen were enrolled. More-
over, commentators point out that percentage plans do not operate in
graduate and professional school admissions, and that in California, the
percentage plan group of students admitted under the plan constitutes a
very small portion of the overall admissions program. 43 In addition, class-
rank plans are not likely to affect enrollments at the particularly elite in-
stitutions in California, namely because Latino/a and African American
students have been steered or have "cascaded" to the lower-ranked state
universities.44
38. See id. at 969.
39. E.g. Selingo, X-Percent Solution, supra note 10, at A31; Mary Frances Berry How Per-
centage Plans Keep Minority Students Out of College, CrmoN. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 4, 2000, at
A48. Pennsylvania is considering whether to admit the top 15% of each high school graduat-
ing class, but the proposal has been put on hold temporarily. Patrick Healey, Texas Plan for
College Diversity Draws Fire, Boston Globe,Aug. 22,2000, at Al.
California is also considering a proposal to admit the top 12.5% of every class, pro-
vided that those in the bottom 8.5% of that group complete two years of community college
with a 2.4 GPA. Susan Gembrowski, UC Admissions Overhaul Could Lift Poor, Minorities, S.D.
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 2000, at Al.
40. Rule 6C-6.002 EA.C.; see PeterT Kilborn,Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirmative Action,
N.Y.TimEs, Feb. 4, 2000, at Al
41. See Berry, supra note 39, at A48.
42. See Paul Attewell, Merit, Testing and Opportunity, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 25, 2000, at 20
(pointing out that California's percentage plan will not take effect until 2001).
43. See e.g. Berry, supra note 39, at A48.
44. See id.
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Perhaps the largest problem with class-rank programs is their limited
applicability. According to Thomas J. Kane, class-rank proposals only pro-
mote diversity in highly segregated states."s Accordingly, several states have
rejected the use of a class-rank program because the state's high schools
are insufficiently segregated by race, and will not achieve the goal of
remedying discrimination or diversifying the classroom.46
Finally, institutions have considered the use of an adversity index,
which contextualizes the applicant's success by considering whether the
applicant has had to overcome difficult hardships, e.g., having a parent in
prison or being the child of a gang member. 7 In Texas, Rice University
considers an applicant's "diverse life experiences" and her success in over-
coming hardship.4" A small number of institutions, like the graduate
school in education at U.C. Berkeley, consider an applicant's commitment
and interest in issues of social justice or those issues related to race and
ethnicity. 9 Results from these adversity-index programs have not been
widely published to date.
These alternative programs, whether they are class-based or disad-
vantage-based, all have tried to capture some facet of the social
disadvantage that historically has accompanied racial discrimination."
45. See Healey, supra note 39, at Al.
46. According to observers, class-rank programs also encourage high schools to manipu-
late class-rank, and evidence suggests that high schools in segregated neighborhoods are more
likely to experience difficulty in submitting class-rank information by the appropriate dead-
line. See Sehngo, X-Percent Solution, supra note 10, at A32.
47. See Attewell, supra note 42, at 21 (discussing adversity indices); See also Forde-Mazrui,
supra note 31, at 2232 n.7 (citing to Michelle Locke, In Post-Affirmative-Action Era, Essays Al-
low Students to Get 'A 'for Adversity, SEArI= TiMEs, May 24, 1998, at A6 (describing recent
University of California "post-affirmative-action" admissions program by which applicants
write "hardship essays" in which they explain difficult circumstances they have faced "such as
poverty, having a parent in prison, speaking English as a second language or having a physical
disability" and stating that "[r]esponses ranged from deaths in the family to being the child of
a gang member")); see also id. (stating that "[a]fter losing a court battle to use race as a factor
in admissions, the [University of Texas] added a two-page statement on disadvantage to its
apphcation this year"); Wade Goodwyn, Morning Edition: Texas Affirmative Action Debate (Na-
tional Public Radio broadcast, May 13, 1998) (explaining that after Hopwood, the University
of Texas "tried to compensate in other ways" including asking applicants to write "essays
about overcoming adversity" in which admissions officers look for certain "kind[s] of quali-
ties in a minority student").
48. SeeAmanda Ripley, YesYour Race Still Matters, TIME, Oct. 23, 2000, at 77.
49. See Michal Lando, Race Debate Continues in UC-Berkeley Graduate School Admissions,
U.WmE, Sept. 5,2000.
50. To date, none of these programs has been challenged in court as unconstitutional or
in violation of a state law such as Proposition 209. Despite clear race-conscious intent to
boost minority enrollment, state legislatures, university trustees or faculties have adopted
these programs as part of an implicit compromise.These programs are allowed to compensate
for post-affirmative action losses in exchange for the repeal of affirmative action. I will argue
in the following section, however, that these programs may withstand legal challenges because
they do not rely on racial classifications. See also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 31 (arguing that
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Unfortunately, each of these programs addresses in piecemeal fashion only
one or two aspects of that disadvantage, and for that reason, fails to cap-
ture the unique convergence of multiple hardships associated with racial
discrimination."' In contrast, the proposal that I outline above attempts to
capture that convergence, by creating a general category that directly asks
whether the applicant has suffered the effects of racial discrimination, to
include economic disadvantage, residential segregation or other discrimi-
nation-related adversities. Moreover, the direct measures program also
seeks out applicants who themselves can work to remedy racial discrimi-
nation, much like the program adopted by the education school at U.C.
Berkeley.
II. DOES THE DIRECT MEASURES PROGRAM CREATE
A RACIAL CLASSIFICATION?
Under modern equal protection jurisprudence, the constitutionality
of a direct measures program will turn on two aspects of the program:
(1) whether the program employs a racial classification; and (2) if the clas-
sification is not race-conscious on its face, whether the law school
intended to create a racial classification. With regard to the first issue, this
section argues that a direct measures program does not employ racial clas-
sifications, and instead relies on race-neutral criteria. The following
section, Part 1II, argues that the program is not intended to serve a dis-
criminatory purpose-i.e., to create a racial classification-but is designed
to advance legitimate institutional goals in remedying past discrimination,
diversifying law school classrooms and providing for historically under-
served communities.
Plaintiffs challenging the direct measures program likely will argue
that the first of the direct measures criteria-whether the applicant has
experienced the effects of racial discrimination-creates an unconstitu-
tional classification on the basis of racial identity. In particular, opponents
are likely to claim that only those racial groups who historically have
been subjected to racial discrimination will qualify under the program.
They will argue that, because the program targets not all forms of dis-
crimination but only discrimination on the basis of racial identity, the
program thereby discriminates on the basis of race, because it will accord
preferences only to those particular racial groups who historically have
suffered from discrimination.
However, this essay argues that the discrimination-related preference
is race-neutral. Although the preference focuses on the applicant's experi-
race-neutral programs may pass constitutional muster despite the fact that they are intended
to boost minority enrollment rates).
51. Anthony Alfieri refers to the "multiple physical and psychosocial aspects of racial
injury."Anthony Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 800, 804 (1996).
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ence of discrimination, it does not at all focus on racial identity or require
that the applicant belong to a particular racial group.
A. Strict Scrutiny and the Intrinsic Harm of Racial Classifications
In modern-era affirmative action jurisprudence, federal courts have
disfavored race-conscious programs, not because they object to the goals
of those programs, but because they find fault with the use of classifica-
tions based on race per se as the means to achieve those objectives. For
example, in Hopwood v. Texas,s2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
invalidated the law school's race-conscious program not because it dis-
agreed with the law school's purpose of correcting prior racial
discrimination. Indeed, the court found the goal to be "wholesome." 3
Rather, the court held that the use of a race-conscious means to achieve
those ends was intrinsically problematic. 4
Similarly, in the last decade, the Court has objected more to the means
of race-conscious affirmative action-the racial classification-than to the
various ends affirmative action serves. In particular, the Court has held that,
whether remedial or invidious in nature, racial classifications cause three
specific types of intrinsic injury. First, race-conscious preferences stigmatize
people of color as unqualified or not deserving of selection "on their
merits." Relying on ideas developed in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,"s
the Court held in City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson that even benign racial
classifications "carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."
In the Court's view, this appears particularly true where race-
conscious affirmative action programs depend for their operation on cer-
tain descriptive assumptions about people of color. According to Justice
Thomas,
52. 78 F3d 932 (1996).
53. Id. at 934 ("The law school has presented no compelling justification, under the
Fourteenth Amendment or Supreme Court precedent, that allows it to continue to elevate
some races over others, even for the wholesome purpose of correcting perceived racial imbal-
ance in the student body.") (emphasis added).
54. See id.
55. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (remedial classifications "may only reinforce common stereo-
types holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection
based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth").
56. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
57. Id. at 493 (citing to Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298) (O'Connor, J., et al); see also Adarand
Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (citing Justice Stevens' concurrence in
Croson, 488 U.S. at 516-17) (remedial legislation "actually imposes a greater stigma on its
supposed beneficiaries").
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[s]o-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that because
of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities
cannot compete with them without their patronizing indul-
gence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of
superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those
who believe that they have been wronged by the govern-
ment's use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a
badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop depend-
encies or to adopt an attitude that they are entitled to
preferences."8
Likewise, in Justice Stevens' view, remedial classifications may be
"perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are
granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is
identified purely by their race." 9
Second, and similarly, the Court argues that race-conscious affirma-
tive action perpetuates consciousness of race and racial difference, and
therefore impedes the move towards an ideal color-blind society in which
skin color is irrelevant.6" Particularly for Justice Scalia, race-conscious
preferences seem counterproductive as a remedy for race discrimination.
"The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is noth-
ing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the
tendency-fatal to a Nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and
women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin.
A solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no solution
at all" 6
58. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas,J., concurring).
59. Croson, 488 U.S. at 517 (citing to Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,545 (1980)).
60. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 ("Because that perception [that beneficiaries of affirma-
tive action are less qualified]-especially when fostered by the Congress of the United States-can only
exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will delay the time when race will become a
truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor") (emphasis in original); see also id. at 239
(Scalia,J., concurring) ("To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most admi-
rable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred.").
61. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia,J., concurring); see also id. at 495 (O'ConnorJ., et
a/) ("The dissent's watered-down version of equal protection review effectively assures that
race will always be relevant in American life, and that the 'ultimate goal' of'elminat[ing] en-
tirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's race' ...
will never be achieved."). See also United Jewish Org. ofWilliamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977).
[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assign-
ment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race
consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on
a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or
needs. Furthermore, even preferential treatment may act to. stigmatize its
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court has argued that
race-conscious affirmative action unfairly penalizes Whites, by foreclosing
opportunities to them on the basis of a trait over which they have no
voluntary control. In Croson, the Court found that "[t]he Richmond Plan
denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage
of public contracts based solely on their race. To whatever racial group
these citizens belong, their 'personal rights' to be treated with equal dig-
nity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole
criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking."62
Focusing on the rights of Whites who are theoretically displaced
through race-conscious affirmative action, the Court has expressed con-
cern about the potentially violent reaction of Whites who perceive that
they have been denied an opportunity on the basis of their race. Justice
Scalia in his concurrence warned that treating Whites unfairly could lead
to racial hostility.
[E]ven benign racial quotas have victims, whose very real
injustice we ignore whenever we deny them enforcement
of their right not to be disadvantaged on the basis of race
.... When we depart from this American principle we play
with fire, and much more than an occasional DeFunis,
Johnson or Croson burns.63
recipient groups, for although intended to correct systemic or institu-
tional inequities, such policy may imply to some the recipients' inferiority
and especial need for protection.
Id. at 173-74 (Brennan,J., concurring) (citation omitted).
62. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493;Justice Brennan indicated that:
[W]e cannot well ignore the social reality that even a benign policy of assign-
ment by race is viewed as unjust by many in our society, especially by those
individuals who are adversely affected by a given classification.This impression
of injustice may be heightened by the natural consequence of our governing
processes that the most 'discrete and insular' of [Whites often will be called
upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of benign discrimination.
Id.
63. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527; see also id. at 493 (majority opinion mentions possible
racial hostility deriving from stigma). Similarly, Justice Powell had focused on White reac-
tions, in his opinion in Bakke. Race-conscious preferences
are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals burdened.
The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may out-
rage those so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These
individuals are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation
they are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in the domi-
nant majority.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,294 (1978) (Powell,J., concurring).
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Thus, in the Court's view, because a classification based on race per
se by its nature stigmatizes minorities, arouses race consciousness and un-
fairly penalizes a potentially resentful dominant class, the government
must use classifications sparingly and only with very good reason." Ac-
cordingly, a majority of the current Court subjects all such
classifications--even remedial race-conscious affirmative action-to strict
scrutiny.
B. Is a Preference Targeting Discrimination
Victims A Racial Classification?
1.The Race Neutrality of TargetingVictims of Discrimination
This essay argues that a direct measures program would not be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny because it does not employ classifications based on
race, nor does it create the sorts of harms the Court identified as associ-
ated with racial classifications. Rather, it relies on characteristics, qualities,
abilities, perspectives and commitments that are race-neutral.
This is true even of the first criteria, which measures whether an
applicant has experienced discrimination. In his concurrence in Croson,
Justice Scalia made the point that granting preferences to applicants who
have experienced racial discrimination does not constitute a preference
on the basis of her racial identity. It is worth setting out his discussion of
the matter at length:
A State can, of course, act 'to undo the effects of past dis-
crimination' in many permissible ways that do not involve
classification by race. In the particular field of state contract-
ing, for example, it may adopt a preference for small
businesses, or even for new businesses-which would make
it easier for those previously excluded by discrimination to
enter the field. Such programs may well have racially dis-
proportionate impact, but they are not based on race. And,
of course, a State may 'undo the effects of past discrimina-
tion' in the sense of giving the identified victim of state
discrimination that which it wrongfully denied him-for
example, giving to a previously rejected [B]lack applicant
the job that, by reason of discrimination, had been awarded
to a [W]hite applicant, even if this means terminating the
latter's employment. In such a context, the [W]hite job-
holder is not being selected for disadvantageous treatment
because of his race, but because he was wrongfully awarded
a job to which another is entitled. That is worlds apart from
64. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
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the system here, in which those to be disadvantaged are
identified solely by race.
I agree with the Court's dictum that a fundamental distinc-
tion must be drawn between the effects of 'societal
discrimination' and the effects of'identified' discrimination,
and that the situation would be different if Richmond's plan
were 'tailored' to identify those particular bidders who 'suf-
fered from the effects of past discrimination by the city or
prime contractors.' In my view, however, the reason that
would make a difference is not, as the Court states, that it
would justify race-conscious action, but rather that it would
enable race-neutral remediation. Nothing prevents Rich-
mond from according a contracting preference to identified
victims of discrimination. While most of the beneficiaries
might be [B]lack, neither the beneficiaries nor those disad-
vantaged by the preference would be identified on the basis
of their race.6"
For Scalia, a program that targets victims of institution-specific racial
discrimination does not constitute a racial classification, even if most of
the beneficiaries are applicants of color. Specifically, Scalia notes that in
such programs, applicants are classified not on the basis of their racial
identity but on their historical experience of discrimination. Analogously,
the direct measures program targets its recipients not on the basis of their
racial identity but on their experience of discrimination.
Although Scalia reserves much of his approval for programs that tar-
get the disadvantaged as such, he also approves programs to compensate
identified victims of state discrimination. To be sure, there is no theoreti-
cal reason to distinguish between programs that target general
disadvantage and those that specifically target the disadvantage that ac-
companies racial discrimination. In both cases, the victims will have been
selected not on the basis of their racial identity but on the basis of their
experience of racial discrimination.66 In fact, as Scalia's language suggests,
the most narrowly-tailored program to remedy racial discrimination
would be to target identified victims of racial discrimination. Requiring
the program to consider other forms of disadvantage would make it vastly
overinclusive, even if beneficial.67
65. Croson, 488 U.S. at 526,528 (Scalia,J., concurring).
66. See id. at 526.
67. Indeed, to the extent that a non-specific disadvantage program is adopted for the
purpose of remedying discrimination, it is not narrowly tailored to accomplish its purpose.
See Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. Rayv. 1781,1787 (1996) (if designed to remedy
past discrimination, race-neutral means that do not target victims of racial discrimination
are not narrowly tailored to advance their goal). See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 506
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By focusing on an applicant's experience of racial discrimination and
not racial identity, the direct measures program draws on Justice Stevens
suggestion in Croson that it would be "more constructive to try to iden-
tify the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged classes that
may justify their disparate treatment" 68 A direct measures program identi-
fies the experience of racial discrimination as a source of disadvantage
that justifies differential treatment.
2.The Modern Court's Distinction Between Racial
Identity and Associated Characteristics
It is very important to note that the program's focus on experiences,
viewpoints and commitments-all of which may be correlated with race-
does not convert the program's criteria into a classification based on race.
Indeed, under modern equal protection jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme
Court has very narrowly defined racial identity-and correspondingly, clas-
sifications based on racial identity-to exclude classifications based on
characteristics or experiences that historically have been strongly correlated,
but are not immutably or necessarily tied to race.
Professor Neil Gotanda famously has pointed out that the Supreme
Court's opinions in Adarand and Croson have defined race in a way that
disassociates and separates racial identity from the historical experiences
and social attributes that are strongly correlated to race.69 Gotanda points
out that in Croson, the Court's definition of race encompassed only those
aspects of racial identity that the Court finds to be immutable: e.g., the
color of a person's skin, his country of origin, his genetic relationship to
an ethnically and physiognomically distinct sub-grouping of homo
sapiens.7"
In other cases, the Court expressly has distinguished between racial
identity and these associated but not immutable characteristics that ac-
company particular racial identities. For example, in Hernandez v. New
York, the Court held that a prosecutor's decision to strike Spanish-
speaking prospective jurors constituted a race-neutral choice." In that
(O'Connor,J., et. al) (suggesting that the city program's decision to include Asians, Indians
and other groups, without evidence that those groups had suffered from discrimination,
betrayed the city's claimed remedial purpose).
68. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 514.
69. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1991).
70. See id. at 28-30, 47-48; see also RICHARD A. POSNEsR, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
366-67 (1981) (defining racial identity per se as separate from experiences, tastes and
aspirations historically associated with race).
71. See Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1991) (The Court accepted
the argument that the Spanish-speaking jurors would not accept the official interpreter's
translation without independently assessing the accuracy of the translation).
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case, the Court defined race-neutral decisions as those "based on some-
thing other than the race" of the person in question.72 The Court
specifically rejected the argument that Spanish-speaking ability was suffi-
ciently correlated with ethnicity or race to be the predicate for a
classification based on race or ethnicity.
73
Under the Court's narrow definition, racial identity apparently does
not include characteristics contingently or historically associated with
race or ethnicity, if those characteristics are not intrinsically tied to racial
identity.4 This narrow definition follows closely from, and is largely
driven by, the Court's reasoning in the modern affirmative action cases. In
the Court's view as expressed in those cases, the central mistake of racism
is stereotyping-using racial identity as a proxy for particular traits and
characteristics that do not depend on racial identity, e.g., assuming that all
Blacks are lazy when productivity is unrelated to racial identity.7 Accord-
ingly, the Court is compelled to distinguish between the immutable
aspects of racial identity-e.g., skin color-and characteristics or traits
that are theoretically independent of racial identity.
Under the Court's relatively restricted definition of racial identity,
the direct measures program does not create a classification based on ra-
cial identity. The program does not distinguish between applicants based
on immutable characteristics like skin color, national origin or member-
ship in a particular racial group. Rather, a direct measures program
classifies applicants on the basis of experiences, viewpoints and commit-
ments that historically have been correlated (but not immutably tied to)
racial identity, like the ability to speak Spanish.
Indeed, the notion that the criteria operate independently of racial
identity is well illustrated by the fact that a White applicant-perhaps a
Cheryl Hopwood or an Alan Bakke-could in theory qualify for prefer-
ences.76 As the next section will point out, in light of that fact, the race-
neutral criteria used in the direct measures program are far more consistent
with an intent to target for specific traits and characteristics than an intent
to create a racial classification.
72. See id. at 360.
73. See id. at 360-61.
74. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (holding that the
standard of review will not vary to reflect differing social histories for differing racial
groups-the standard does not depend on the race of those burdened or benefitted).
75. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (racial classifi-
cations are harmful because they reinforce racist stereotypes); see also Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, 1990 DUKE LJ. 758 (1990) (contrasting the conservative definition of racism
as stereotyping with a more radical definition that would have called for the systematic
redistribution of resources and opportunities along racial lines).
76. Both Cheryl Hopwood and Alan Bakke, plaintiffs in reverse discrimination cases
to dismantle affirmative action programs, were White. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276; Hopwood,
78 F3d 937 n.8.
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III. DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE: Is THE DIRECT MEASURES PROGRAM
INTENDED TO CREATE A RACIAL CLASSIFICATION?
Although the direct measures program does not directly rely on ra-
cial identity, that fact will probably not insulate it from legal challenge.
Indeed, because the program does not create a racial classification on its
face, critics of such a proposal are likely also to challenge the program
under the "discriminatory purpose" doctrine. In particular, opponents are
likely to argue that a direct measures program is a pretext for a covert
discriminatory purpose. More specifically, they likely will argue that the
program is intended to create a set of preferences that will favor appli-
cants of color in law school admissions despite its ostensibly race-neutral
character.
However, as I will argue in this section, the direct measures program
is designed not for the purpose of racial balancing, but rather to directly
target race-neutral characteristics and traits for which racial identity for-
merly was used as a proxy. The criteria used in the program are more
consistent with an intent to directly measure for desired characteristics.
A. Discriminatory Purpose and the Court's Redistricting Cases
Plaintiffs challenging a direct measures program likely would argue
that the program is in fact intended to create an impermissible racial clas-
sification, and thus to achieve an impermissible discriminatory purpose.
Such an argument is made easier by recent changes in the discriminatory
purpose doctrine.
Generally speaking, to successfully challenge a facially race-neutral
affirmative action program, plaintiffs must show that the legislature had
the predominant motive of creating a racial classification.77 It is not
enough to show that the decision making body was conscious of racial
identity or had thought about race in some general way. Nor does it suf-
fice to demonstrate that the motive to classify on the basis of racial
identity was one of several legislative motives.78 In the Court's view, the
constitutional wrong occurs when race becomes the "dominant and con-
trolling" consideration.79
In recent redistricting opinions, the Court has significantly loosened
requirements for a discriminatory purpose challenge. Previously, the
Court had demanded evidence of invidious identity-based animus to sus-
tain a discriminatory purpose challenge. In Personnel Administrator of
77. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that awareness of race is permis-
sible, and does not inevitably lead to impermissible race discrimination).
78. Id.
79. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 904 (1996) (referring to Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S.
900,915 (1995)).
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Massachusetts v. Feeney,"" the Court required proof that the government
had chosen a course of action "at least in part 'because of,' not merely in
spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."1
Under recent changes to the discriminatory purpose doctrine, how-
ever, it is now enough if challengers merely prove that the program was
intended to create a racial classification."2 In Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), the
Court held that plaintiffs are no longer required to prove animus. 3 In
that case, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a North Carolina
legislative redistricting plan that had created an irregularly shaped district.
In its opinion, the Court held that plaintiffs adequately had stated an
equal protection claim by alleging that the district's bizarre shape could
be explained only on the grounds of race. 4
The dissenters were quick to point out that plaintiffs had produced
no evidence of invidious animus and that the redistricting plan did not
dilute the voting power of the racial majority.8 Relying on its reasoning
in Adarand and Croson, the majority responded that strict scrutiny was
warranted because race-conscious redistricting by its very nature rein-
forces racial stereotypes, undermines a system of representative
democracy 6 arouses race consciousness, and balkanizes the country into
racial factions. 7 Accordingly, the Court held that strict scrutiny applied to
80. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
81. Id. at 279 (emphasis added) (deciding to uphold a lifetime preference for state
civil service employment to military veterans, despite its extreme disproportionate impact
on women). Cf Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (striking down Alabama con-
stitution provision which disenfranchised voters convicted of moral turpitude because it
was enacted with invidious animus against Blacks). In addition, the Court in Feeney held
that statistical evidence of disproportionate impact on a particular group was not suffi-
cient, by itself, to prove discriminatory animus. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277.
82. For an excellent summary and commentary on the evolution of the redistricting
cases, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Con-
stitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. R-Ev. 588 (1993).
83. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 666-67 (White, J., dissenting) (no evidence of discriminatory purpose
when Whites' voting strength is not diluted).
86. In particular, the Court found that racial gerrymandering perpetuates impermis-
sible stereotypes because it "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial
group-regardless of their age, education, economic status or the community in which
they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candi-
dates at the polls'" Id. at 647. Moreover, it undermines democracy "by signaling to elected
officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a
whole." Id. at 650.
87. "Even in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by
race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility
and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an
individual's worth or needs." Id. at 643.The Court in Shaw I went on to find that, "even
for remedial purposes, [racial gerrymandering] may balkanize us into competing racial
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race-conscious redistricting, regardless of whether government had in-
tended to disadvantage a particular racial group.88 In particular, the Court
found sufficient an allegation that the government had intended to ra-
cially gerrymander a district, and that race had been the predominant
factor in the drawing of district lines.89
B. Does the Direct Measures Program Have a Discriminatory Purpose?
Relying on this recent doctrinal change, challengers could argue
that a direct measures program should be subject to strict scrutiny be-
cause it is intended to grant preferences to applicants based on their race,
and is designed to circumvent the ban on race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion. Plaintiffs could argue that, like the irregular districting lines of the
North Carolina plan, the unique and irregular combination of direct
measures criteria is so unusual and irregular that the program cannot be
explained as anything other than an attempt to create a racial preference.9"
Moreover, plaintiffs could ask a court to take judicial notice of the
historical timing of any law school's decision to adopt a direct measures
affirmative action program.91 Specifically, they might point out that the
law school will have adopted the preferences in the wake of Hopwood,
Proposition 209 and other legal prohibitions on race-conscious affirma-
tive action. This argument would hold even more weight were it to be
coupled with the argument that law schools have adopted alternative
factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race
no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to
which the Nation continues to aspire." Id. at 657.
88. Id. at 644 (applying strict scrutiny where redistricting legislation is "so bizarre on
its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race' ") (citing toVill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266 (1977)).
89. See also Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (plaintiff must show only that
race was predominant factor motivating legislature); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899,
905 (1996) (reaffirming standard in Miller); Bush v.Vera, 517 U.S. 952,980-82 (1996) (plu-
rality opinion holding that strict scrutiny applies only when all other legitimate
redistricting principles are subordinated to race); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546
(1999) (facially neutral law warrants strict scrutiny if it can be proved that the law was
motivated by a racial purpose or object).
90. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 644-47. "In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment
plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as any-
thing other than an effort to 'segregate ... voters' on the basis of race." Id. at 646-47
(alteration in original).
91. Courts routinely consider the historical background of the decision in question,
including the series of events that lead up to the decision in determining the purpose of
government action. E.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
540 (1993) (noting that city officials imposed ordinance prohibiting ritual sacrifice of
animals a few weeks after church announced its intent to locate in the city) (citing to
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67).
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affirmative action programs in response to pressure from minority groups,
as a strategy to negotiate the racial politics that inevitably surrounds ad-
missions processes.
1. Admitting White Applicants: Criteria Consistent
with a Race-Neutral Purpose
Although a discriminatory purpose challenge to the direct measures
program might prove quite formidable, law schools can rely on those
same redistricting cases to mount an equally compelling response. Specifi-
cally, law school defendants can argue that the direct measures criteria is
equally consistent, if not more consistent, with an intent to target specific
race-neutral traits, characteristics and abilities in prospective law school
students.
Under the Court's recent redistricting cases, the Court has refused
to strike down a facially race-neutral program, where the criteria are con-
sistent with a race-neutral purpose. In Hunt v. Cromartie (Hunt II),"2 the
Court addressed the constitutionality of a district that had been redrawn
after the Court had struck down an earlier set of boundaries as
unconstitutional. The Court noted that, while there was a strong
correlation between the boundaries and racial demographics, the
evidence also supported the conclusion that the new boundaries had
been drawn to target solidly Democratic voters.93 Noting the strong
evidentiary correlation between voting behavior and racial identity, the
Court framed the question as "whether the legislature drew District 12's
boundaries because of race rather than because of political behavior ...- 9"
The Court went on to uphold the redistricting plan, pointing out that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that "race, rather than politics,
predominantly accounts for the result."9
In Hunt 1,96 the Court took note of the fact that the plan captured
White Democrats rather than Black voters who were not reliably De-
mocrat voters. There, the Court pointed to evidence that, at the
boundaries, district lines were drawn to capture voters who were likely to
vote for Democratic candidates, even when those voters were white.97 In
ultimately upholding the program against a discriminatory purpose chal-
lenge, the Court relied heavily on expert conclusions that politics
92. 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001).
93. Id. at 1463-64.
94. Id. at 1466 (emphasis in original).
95. Id.
96. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
97. See id. at 545.
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constituted as good an explanation for the boundaries as an intent to ra-
cially balance.98
Similarly, law schools can argue that the program's "boundaries" are
more consistent with legitimate institutional motives-to remedy
discrimination, diversify the classroom and provide resources for
underserved communities-than with a motive to create a racial
classification. Most importantly, like the plan in Hunt, a direct measures
program will admit White applicants who can demonstrate that they
have experienced racial discrimination, that they offer a diverse
viewpoint on racial justice not well-represented in the classroom, or
that they are committed to providing resources to historically
underserved communities.White students who can make a claim to any
of these criteria will not be barred from qualifying for a preference
under the program, and in fact will be eligible for the preference.Just as
the program in Hunt preferred White Democrats to Black Republicans
on the boundaries, the direct measures program prefers the White
applicant who fulfill the relevant criteria to the Black applicant who
does not.
Of course, as was also true in Hunt II, there undoubtedly will be a
strong statistical correlation between particular racial identities and the
applicant characteristics at issue-an experience of discrimination, a
diverse viewpoint on issues of racial justice, and a willingness to serve
areas that historically have been underserved. But the correlation does
not render the program unconstitutional. As Justice O'Connor has
noted with regard to racial redistricting, "[i]f district lines merely corre-
late with race because they are drawn on the basis of political affiliation,
which correlates with race, there is no racial classification to justify."99
Similarly, if the criteria used in the direct measures program strongly
correlate with race because they are drawn on the basis of traits or
characteristics or commitments that historically (but not immutably)
correlate with race, there is no evidence of an intent to create a racial
classification.
As Hunt II demonstrates, it is perfectly permissible, even encour-
aged, for governments to design programs that more directly measure
the attributes for which race has conventionally served as proxy. In
Hunt II, the North Carolina legislature redrew district boundaries based
on political behavior immediately after the Supreme Court had struck
down earlier boundaries as unconstitutional racial classifications. It was
this revised program that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld as con-
stitutional, despite the plan's history and the strong correlation between
the boundary lines and the racial composition of the district. Likewise,
the direct measures program is meant to replace race-conscious affirma-
98. Hunt II, 121 S. Ct. at 1463-64.
99. Bush v.Vera, 517 U.S. 952,968 (1996) (O'ConnorJ., principal opinion).
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tive action programs, and will be adopted to more directly pursue the
objectives advanced by race-conscious programs.
2. Historical Motives for Race-Conscious Affirmative Action
Although opponents might argue that race-conscious affirmative
action is designed to achieve nothing more than pure racial balancing,
historical evidence demonstrates, to the contrary, that such programs
originally were adopted as an administratively efficient, inexpensive and
pragmatic way to remedy the effects of discrimination. Tracing the evo-
lutionary history of affirmative action, Professor John D. Skrentny has
argued that the federal government embraced racial classifications as a
pragmatic means of complying with the dictates of the new civil rights
legislation passed in the 1960s.'0 ° Skrentny notes that, in spite of the
faith that civil rights groups had put in the notion of colorblindness,10'
federal agencies subsequently encountered problems when attempting
to press discrimination claims under the colorblind model."2 Among
other difficulties, the EEOC found it difficult to provide direct evi-
dence of intentional discrimination, and as a result, prosecutions under
the intentional discrimination model yielded poor results.' °3 In addition,
agencies confronted many bureaucratic difficulties when monitoring,
investigating and processing discrimination cases. 4 Because individual-
ized monitoring of employers and contractors would have been
prohibitively expensive, 0 5 government agencies began to focus on dis-
parities in the racial composition of the workforce, and to encourage
preferences in employment and promotion as a way of reducing those
disparities.0 6 Thus, according to Skrentny, administrators turned to race-
conscious classifications not to racially balance, but to ensure that their
efforts produced visible results."7
Similarly, law schools appear to have been motivated by the desire
for efficiency when making their initial decisions to adopt race-
conscious affirmative action programs. The history of affirmative action
100. See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIvE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 111 (1996). Skrentny also suggests that the government acted to
produce quick results in part because the government faced the rising threat of social
unrest. See id.
101. Id. at 113.
102. Id. at 115, 118-20.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 123, 134
105. Id. at 142.
106. Id. at 114-20,127-32.
107. "In the early 1950s, this technical logic of administrative pragmatism led to a
simple conclusion: Choose race consciousness and effectiveness, or choose color blindness
and failure." Id. at 117.
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at the University of Texas at Austin School of Law is perhaps not atypi-
cal of public law schools. In the late 1960s, the U.T law school adopted
its first affirmative action program to recruit applicants of color out of
its CLEO (Continuing Legal Education Opportunity) program.' Dis-
satisfied with the results, the law school terminated the CLEO program.
In the early 1970s, U.T created a separate committee to review the ap-
plications of disadvantaged individuals, primarily targeting (but not
limited to) applicants of color."°9
Administrators justified a separate committee on two grounds.
First, the university had an obligation to train a reasonably representa-
tive cross-section of the population."' Second, the applicants' predictive
index (made up of test scores and grades) "did not adequately account
for an applicant's ability to overcome past economic, cultural, and dis-
criminatory practices."'1
In 1980, out of concern for fairness to non-minority students, the
law school asked the separate subcommittee solely to review minority
files." 2 In 1992, the law school significantly revised its affirmative action
program for reasons relating primarily to "administrative efficiency" 3
In particular, the law school vested a sub-committee of the full admis-
sions committee with authority to review minority files, and
subsequently to recommend a sufficient number of applicants to enroll
a certain target percentage of Black and Mexican-American students."'
In its 1992 Statement of Policy on Affirmative Action,"' the law school
outlined the three primary objectives of this affirmative action program:
(1) to provide first-class training for future state bench and bar mem-
108. Hopwood v.Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 557 (WD.Tex. 1994).
109. Id. at 558.
110. Id. at 558 n.12.
111. Id. Before settling on this remedy, the law school tried several different formula-
tions of committee responsibility. Id. at 558.
112. See id. at 558.
113. When reviewing the evolution of Texas law school's affirmative action policy, the
court indicated that
as the pool of minority candidates improved, the focus of the meetings
shifted to choosing among minority candidates that the committee knew,
based on their TIs, (Texas Index, the law school's predictive index) could
succeed in law school. Therefore, less full committee review of each indi-
vidual file became necessary. Ultimately, the admissions committee
determined that the process was inefficient and not the most effective
way of processing minority applicants.
Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
114. Id. The fuill committee did not conduct their own review of these files, but only
decided how many recommended applicants would receive offers of admission. Id.
115. Id. at 569.
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bers;" 6 (2) to redress prior discrimination against Blacks and Mexican-
Americans;" 7 and (3) to diversify the law school population in order to
improve education.'
This historical account suggests that administrators relied on racial
identity as an administratively efficient proxy in order to remedy prior
discrimination and diversify the law school population. Like so many
other institutions of the time, the law school used racial classifications not
as ends in themselves, or to pursue "outright racial balancing"' 19 Rather,
they used race indirectly to achieve other objectives-to advance the mis-
sion of the law school to train future leaders, to remedy the effects of
prior discrimination and to diversify the law school population for edu-
cational purposes. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that law
schools adopting the direct measures program will do so for the same
sorts of legitimate reasons that motivated them to adopt the original
race-conscious programs.
The fact that law schools may adopt a direct measures program in
order to achieve the same legitimate goals as race-conscious affirmative
action does not render the program unconstitutional. As Kim Forde-
Mazrui has explained:
Standing alone, the adoption of race-neutral policies in lieu
of impermissible racial preferences to achieve the same ob-
jectives need not mean the program is a subterfuge for
illegitimate purposes. If the objectionable nature of a racial
116. Id. at 570. ("To achieve the School of Law's mission of providing a first class legal
education to future leaders of the bench and bar of the state by offering real opportunities
for admission to members of the two largest minority groups in Texas, Mexican Ameri-
cans and African Americans ....")
117. The law school offered the following as compelling justifications in its "Statement
of Policy on Affirmative Action:"
To assist in redressing the decades of educational discrimination to which
African Americans and Mexican Americans have been subjected in the
public school systems of the State of Texas; To achieve compliance with
the 1983 consent decree entered with the Office of Civil Rights of the
Department of Education imposing specific requirement for increased ef-
forts to recruit AfricanAmerican and Mexican American students ....
118. Also in the law schools "Statement of Policy on Affirmative Action":
To achieve the diversity of background and experience in its student
population essential to prepare students for the real world functioning of
the law in our diverse nation ... [T]o achieve compliance with the
American Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools
standards of commitment to pluralist diversity in the law school's student
population.
Id.
119. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,507 (1989).
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preference-based program relates to its means and not its
purpose, then the replacement of those means with race-
neutral criteria cures the objection. 2 '
Accordingly, law schools need not deny their more recent history
with regard to the timing of a direct measures program. It is desirable, not
impermissible, for institutions to revise their policies to conform to re-
cent Court pronouncements or in anticipation of a Court decision on a
matter of constitutional importance. Indeed, law schools should well be
expected, in light of the Court's continuing difficulty with racial classifi-
cations as a means, to search for a constitutional race-neutral means to
remedy the effects of discrimination. 2
IV ADVANTAGES OF THE DIRECT MEASURES ALTERNATIVE
Beyond satisfying its direct objectives-remedying discrimination,
diversifying the law school and providing for the underserved-a direct
measures program also contributes a great deal to the conversation about
race. This section discusses three aspects of the program's rhetorical (and
practical) appeal. First, the direct measures criteria encourages racial
communities and law school admissions committees to fully describe
those social experiences and histories that are correlated to racial dis-
crimination. An applicant who wishes to qualify for the admissions
preference must describe the types of disadvantage she has suffered in
connection with racial discrimination.'22 These detailed stories, which
communicate the continuing harm of discrimination to law schools and
the larger legal community, are valuable contributions to the public con-
versation about race.
123
In addition, law school admissions committees, and presumably the
larger law school community, likely will have important and difficult con-
versations about what types of institutionalized disadvantage "counts" as
racial discrimination, and what types of discrimination the committee
finds particularly compelling.1 24 For example, schools will have to deter-
120. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 31, at 2390.
121. See id.
122. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I believe it is more con-
structive to try to identify the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged classes
that may justify their disparate treatment.")
123. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 192 (1989) (describ-
ing the value of"detailed descriptions of particular varieties of pain and humiliation" as a
means of communicating the injury of oppression to a privileged majority).
124. For an excellent discussion of institutionalized discrimination, see Ian Haney
Lopez, Institutional Racism:Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109
YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (arguing that racist institutional practices become embedded in
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mine whether to grant a preference to students who grew up in residen-
tially segregated neighborhoods but who attended an expensive private
school paid for by relatively wealthy grandparents. Similarly, applicants
and the law school community will be asked to consider the ways in
which Whites might have suffered from racial discrimination, or the ways
in which some communities of color discriminate against each other. To-
gether with applicants' stories, the arguments that develop within and
outside of law schools in connection with a "direct measures" program
will contribute to what Frank Michelman calls republican jurisgenerative
political conversation. 2 That is, such a conversation will help to build a
public fund of normative references, including narratives, analogies and
other expressions of political commitment, from which people can draw
to engage in dialogues about constitutional values, equal protection and
affirmative action. 126
In addition to its rhetorical appeal, the direct measures program pro-
vides the practical advantage that it is self-terminating.1 2' Law schools will
no longer be able to grant preferences when students can no longer qual-
ify under the relevant criteria. Specifically, the program will terminate
when applicants can no longer claim to suffer the effects of racial dis-
crimination, when all viewpoints are well represented in the law school
classroom, and when no community is systematically unable to obtain
legal resources and services. Again, law school communities will have to
engage in conversations about whether the time has come to terminate
such a program. Indeed, the essays and applications of prospective students
might serve as useful indicators or markers of the state of discrimination,
as they will reflect progress (or the lack thereo) in the struggle to remedy
the effects of past discrimination.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the direct measures pro-
gram is rhetorically appealing because it works "within the system."
Namely, it takes full advantage-rightful advantage, some would say--of
the Court's quite narrow definition of racial identity to create a set of
preferences that are race-neutral. In this way, the direct measures program
constitutes an example of radical pragmatism-using the master's tools to
dismantle the master's house.
Equal protection law might well have understood racism far differ-
ently, and defined the concept of racial identity more broadly. Namely,
antidiscrimination law might have targeted not just intentional irrational
institutional structures in a way that permits their reproduction without conscious intent
to discriminate).
125. See Frank Michelman, Laws Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513-15 (1988).
126. Id.
127. The fact that the program self-terminates is a further indication that it is narrowly
tailored to remedy prior discrimination. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38 (in assessing
narrow tailoring, the trial court should consider "whether program [is] appropriately lim-
ited [so as] 'not to last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate' ").
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acts based on stereotypes but also the historical creation of a social system
that systematically has subordinated communities of color and created a
perpetual underclass along racial lines. 2 ' Under this alternative view, racial
identity might have included the contingent historical experiences, social
disadvantage and systematic subordination that have come to be strongly
correlated with race.
Under that progressive view, the Court in Hernandez v. New York
might have held that the exclusion of jurors based on their ability to
speak Spanish constituted racial discrimination. Similarly, the Court might
have differentiated invidious discrimination from remedial affirmative
action on the basis of different historical experiences associated with ra-
cial identities. However, given that the Court has chosen the narrower
view of racism and racial identity, it appears legitimate to insist that insti-
tutions be permitted to target that part of social experience and history
that the Court has defined as unconnected to racial identity.
As Justice Scalia rightly observed in Croson, "[i]t is plainly true that
in our society Blacks have suffered discrimination immeasurably greater
than any directed at other groups."'29 A direct measures program, which
directly addresses discrimination without relying on racial classifications,
is one constitutionally permissible step towards compensation for victims
from that group and every other racial group that has suffered the injuries
of discrimination.
128. See Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MiNN. L. Ra. 1049, 1054-55 (1978) (de-
scribing broader view of discrimination as systematic material subordination of people of
color).
129. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,527 (1989).
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